There is a vast research literature that chronicles the impact when a company suffers a major governance failure (which might be due to an ethical or accounting violation or to insufficient risk management and oversight). First, stock prices fall around the initial announcement period, with the magnitude of the decline commensurate with the severity of the failure.
1 Second, stock price underperformance tends to persist well past the announcement period, suggesting that the damage to the company is of potential long-term consequence.
2 Third, the companies (and their officers and directors) often face lawsuits from shareholders and regulators, who seek to be compensated for their losses.
3 And finally, there is elevated turnover in both the executive suite and the boardroom, as companies signal to the market that they are serious about reform. 4 The impact on the long-term careers of the former executives and directors of these companies, however, is less clear. Recent experience suggests that many CEOs and directors of failed companies are able to retain outside directorships-and even obtain new ones-following their forced departures. For example, after resigning from Citigroup in 2007, former chairman and CEO Charles Prince was elected to the board of Xerox. Stanley O'Neill, former chairman and CEO of Merrill Lynch, was not only named a director of Alcoa but was also appointed to that company's audit committee. Nonexecutive directors at Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Bear Stearns, and AIG all gained new directorships after their companies failed (see Exhibit 1).
5
Clearly, circumstance plays a role in determining whether leaders of failed companies are fit to serve as directors of other organizations. For example, the By david f. larcker and Brian tayan september 1, 2011 assessment might be based on the degree to which these individuals were associated with wrongdoing. They might also depend on the individual's capacity to learn from error. In these cases, companies might benefit from the knowledge and experience gained firsthand by individuals who have been involved with a crisis or failure.
On the other hand, there are reasons why the executives and directors of failed companies might not be fit to hold future directorships. First, governance failures are not the same as managerial failures. Executives are hired with the express purpose of taking strategic risk to increase shareholder value, some of which might not work out as hoped. Corporate monitors, by contrast, are hired with the express purpose of detecting malfeasance. While "failure" is an expected part of a managerial job, it is not an expected part of a monitoring job. 6 Second, governance failure might reveal underlying character flaws in the leaders themselves. If executives and directors were not sufficiently engaged in their duties (or, worse, if they exhibited low levels of integrity), these shortcomings might manifest themselves again in other settings. Third, companies that retain such individuals in the future might be subject to heightened scrutiny. Rightly or wrongly, these individuals have incurred reputational damage simply through their association with a failed firm. Companies that subsequently employ them are likely to face pushback from shareholders and stakeholders.
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There is some evidence that the executives of failed companies are treated more strictly than the directors of those same companies. According to a recent survey of executives and directors, only 37 percent believe that the former CEO of a company that experienced substantial accounting and ethical problems can be a good board member at another company. By contrast, 67 percent of respondents believe that directors of such a company can be a good board member elsewhere. When asked to elaborate, respondents tend to suggest that the CEO is held to a higher standard of accountability, given his or her position of leadership. By contrast, directors are presumed to have less involvement in potential violations and are also seen as able to learn from mistakes of this nature. However, these opinions are not universal (see Exhibit 2). "the ceo may only know what he/she has been presented."
"a good ceo learns why he missed the flaws, and does not drop the ball twice…"
"as long as their integrity is not compromised, experience can be valuable / add a new perspective."
"as the ceo, he or she clearly must have had some lapse in leadership and oversight for there to be a substantial accounting or ethical issue in his/her tenure."
"ethical problems are not caused by a lack of knowledge, they are caused by character flaws (and character doesn't change)."
"even if they learned valuable lessons the reputational risks are too high and their credibility with other board members is a problem."
"once tainted, it is impossible to regain confidence in their integrity."
"tone at the top is a key driver of corporate culture and the ceo is the most influential person in setting tone at the top.
accounting and ethics issues at his / her company are usually the result of problems with ceo performance."
regarding directors:
"assuming the board member was not involved in the irregularities, he or she should have learned valuable lessons from the experience."
"at the end of the day it is the board that shareholders place trust in, and they must have and show understanding of the company's accounts."
"Board members can be misled by management and learning to be skeptical from such an experience can make for a better board member."
"if it happened on their watch, you have to question how engaged they are in good governance."
"Board members are more effective generally if they have experienced difficulties in their own careers."
